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Abstract 
Since the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 
bilateral and multilateral donors have stressed that development assistance has increasingly 
been oriented towards climate-friendly interventions. With respect to energy aid, this should 
lead to a substantial increase in projects related to renewable energy and energy efficiency. 
Given a new database of hundreds of thousands of bilateral development assistance projects, 
we can assess whether such a reorientation has indeed taken place. We find that, contrary to 
expectations, the share of bilaterally-funded renewable energy and energy efficiency projects 
did not increase over the period from 1980 to 2008. This share fluctuated greatly, following 
the price of oil, peaking with the second oil crisis of the early 1980s. The impacts of global 
climate policy treaties are minor or inexistent. ‘Traditional’ renewable energies such as hydro 
and geothermal declined, while “new” renewables showed two peaks in the early 1980s and 
late 1990s. Differences between donor countries are huge. Several countries, including 
climate sceptics such as the US and Australia, but also the UK and Switzerland, saw a 
consistent decline. The self-proclaimed climate pioneers such as Germany, the Netherlands, 
Norway and Sweden show peaks related to both the oil crises and international climate policy. 
Only in Austria, Denmark, Finland and Spain can ‘new’ climate mitigation development 
assistance be found. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since its inception in the late 1940s development assistance has engaged in building hydro 
power plants. It has also tried to improve the livelihoods of marginal populations through off-
grid electrification using photovoltaics or by improving the efficiency of charcoal stoves. 
Since the late 1980s it has become clear that such activities contribute to mitigation of climate 
change as they lower greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions compared to energy supply based on 
fossil fuels. 
 
International climate policy has emerged as a key policy field in the last two decades, starting 
with the setting up of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988 and the 
beginning of negotiations regarding a United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) in 1991. The UNFCCC was adopted at the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Legally binding GHG emissions 
commitments for industrialised countries and the period from 2008 to 2012 were agreed in the 
Kyoto Protocol in 1997. After protracted negotiations this protocol entered into force in 2005. 
It contains a set of international market mechanisms, with the clean development mechanism 
(CDM) allowing the generation of emissions credits through GHG reduction projects in 
developing countries. The CDM became an unexpected success; over 5000 projects have been 
mobilised that are forecast to reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) by approximately 1 billion tonnes 
by the end of 2012 (UNEP Riso Centre, 2010). The CDM has led to the emergence of a wide 
range of private companies developing projects and providing consultancy to successfully 
complete the complex regulatory cycle. In 2005 negotiations for the period after 2012 started 
with a view to agreeing an international regime at the Climate Conference in Copenhagen 
conference held late in 2009. However, at Copenhagen agreement proved elusive and the 
post-2012 regime remains uncertain. 
 
Ever since the Rio conference in 1992 combining development and climate-related efforts has 
been an international objective, embodied in the principle of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities’ (Centre for International Sustainable Development Law, 2002). In addition, 
due to the scarcity of real successes, traditional development assistance faced a confidence 
crisis in the 1980s. Development agencies may thus have been eager to contribute to the new 
and more fashionable objective of mitigating climate change. The expected trend raised some 
concerns about the priorities of development assistance (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2007). 
 
At the same time proponents of the climate change agenda suggest that donor support for 
climate change mitigation in developing countries is much lower than required and that actual 
disbursement of climate change-related aid pledges is dismal (Vidal, 2009). 
 
Thus, on one hand, there is the reproach that too much climate aid has shifted the priorities of 
development cooperation away from the central objective of poverty reduction. On the other 
hand, there is the accusation that despite all promises too little aid has been channelled into 
activities in support of the Rio Convention on Climate Change. 
 
Due to the scarcity of reliable data, neither of the two arguments has been seriously tested so 
far. However, a new project-level aid (PLAID) database, available to the public since March 
2010, now provides a much better source of information on the development of aid activities 
– including individual projects, but also programme support, budget support and so on – in 
this field (AidData, 2010).1 Based on individual project descriptions, we code over 750,000 
                                                 
1 For ease of exposition we will use the terms ‘project’ and ‘aid activity’ interchangeably in the context of this 
paper. In any case, traditional projects are still the dominant category in today’s development cooperation. 
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bilateral aid activities of 21 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors with respect to their relevance 
for specific types of energy efficiency and renewable energy. We exclude multilateral aid 
(which, according to OECD-DAC (2002a), covered about 15 per cent of the total climate 
change-related aid flows) because the decision making of multilateral donors such as the 
World Bank is likely to depend on parameters that are different from the decision making of 
individual governments (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2010b). On this basis we address the 
following questions: 
 
• Has there been a real change in development activities towards a greater emphasis on 
renewable energy and energy efficiency? 
 
• And if so, what are the major drivers of this effect? Has the change come about as a 
consequence of the international treaties on climate policy or, more generally, of a 
stronger environmental consciousness in donor countries? Or is it primarily related to 
traditional factors such as industrial lobbies and energy prices driving decisions in 
development policy, and therefore unrelated to public opinion or green political 
ideology? Is there any interaction with the CDM which targets projects in developing 
countries? 
 
In Chapter 2 we develop the conceptual framework of this analysis based on the idea that the 
relevance of renewable energy and energy efficiency projects could be driven either by the 
same traditional factors as ever (‘old wine’, business as usual) or by the effect of international 
climate policy agreements since Rio, and by environmental preferences of donor country 
citizens and governments. In Chapter 3 we describe the new PLAID database, our coding 
procedure for bilateral aid related to renewable energy and energy efficiency, and the 
additional political-economic variables to be considered. Chapter 4 provides an initial 
empirical assessment based on descriptive statistics. Chapter 5 finally brings all arguments 
together in an econometric analysis and Chapter 6 concludes. 
 
2. Old wine or political impact of greener preferences in the post-Rio era: a conceptual 
framework 
 
In order to distinguish between ‘business as usual’ and change in sectoral aid allocation 
related to the Rio summit and post-Rio environmental preferences of donor country citizens 
and governments, we develop a general framework encompassing both parts of the argument. 
The ‘old wine’ or ‘business as usual’ argument suggests that either nothing changed at all 
after 1992 or, if something changed, this should only be in relation to factors that drove such 
change already before 1992. In the context of aid a typical determinant of any given donor’s 
sectoral allocation is a certain comparative advantage in the sector. In our context we would 
thus expect donors with relatively strong renewable energy sectors or strong know-how in 
energy efficiency to be particularly active in these fields, independently of the implications of 
the Rio summit or related environmental preferences. In addition, aid policy traditionally 
reacts to global economic trends that influence economic development. Since energy supply is 
considered vital for development, the price of oil is one important factor considered in this 
context. As a consequence, we expect that throughout our measurement period the  high price 
of oil should have increased donors’ support for renewable energy and energy efficiency. 
 
The alternative policy change argument suggests a direct or an indirect impact of the Rio 
summit with its agreement on the UNFCCC and the following international negotiations on 
the mitigation of climate change, which led to the signing of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 and 
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its entry into force in 2005. From 2005 onwards the CDM started its great upswing with over 
2000 projects registered within five years. This shows that private funds for emissions 
mitigation projects in developing countries can actually be mobilised and should have 
underpinned the case for similar, perhaps somewhat less attractive, projects financed through 
development assistance. Any direct impact should be reflected in a clear difference between 
sectoral aid allocations before and after 1992, 1997 and 2005. An indirect effect could work 
via these negotiations and subsequent debates shaping public and governmental preferences in 
donor countries. In this case we should expect changes in aid allocation to follow changes in 
donor government composition or, alternatively, in voters’ preferences as expressed for 
example in their vote share for environmental parties. 
 
In this context it is assumed that environmental policy has become such a prominent part of 
international and national policy debates that it may be relevant for electoral decisions. This is 
indeed confirmed by other studies (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2010a, List and Sturm, 
2006, Blanke, 2002). Hicks et al. (2008, p. 160) speak of a ‘political market for environmental 
aid in wealthy countries’ and argue that ‘this market is shaped by the preferences of voters 
within each country’. 
 
We can summarise the above discussion through two sets of hypotheses: 
 
(a) ‘Old wine’ model 
H1: An increase in a donor’s comparative advantage in renewable energy and energy 
efficiency leads to more aid for the respective sectors. 
H2: An increase in the price of oil leads to more aid for renewable energy and energy 
efficiency. 
 
(b) Policy change model 
H3: With every new international climate policy agreement donors increase their aid for 
renewable energy and energy efficiency. 
H4: Greener donor government preferences lead to higher aid for renewable energy and 
energy efficiency. 
H5: Greener public preferences in donor countries lead to higher aid for renewable energy and 
energy efficiency. 
 
3. The data 
 
Our dependent variable is the share of renewable energy or energy efficiency projects in total 
aid. We calculate this share both in terms of project numbers and in terms of financial 
commitments. All aid data are retrieved from the new PLAID database (AidData, 2010) 
whose detailed project descriptions enable us to specify all relevant project categories. The 
donors’ own coding as reported to the DAC is far too general and rather imprecise (Roberts et 
al., 2008, Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2010a), so it cannot be used in this study. 
 
Our coding procedure was based on the following three steps: 
 
First, we decided on a comprehensive list of key words relevant in the context of climate 
change mitigation (both renewable energy and energy efficiency). These key words were 
derived from project types found in the CDM as listed by UNEP Riso Centre (2010). These 
key words include: energy, fuel switch, methane, carbon capture, industrial gas, hydro-fluoro-
carbon (HFC), nitrous oxide (N2O), per-fluoro-carbon (PFC), sulphur hexafluoride (SF6), 
forestation, reforestation, forestry, transport, renewable, biomass, geothermal, hydro, solar, 
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photovoltaic, wind, power, landfill, composting, waste, stove, charcoal, retrofit, rehabilitation, 
cogeneration, electricity, boiler, heating, flaring, steam, efficiency, manure, biogas. This key 
word search led to an overall output of over 30,000 projects potentially relevant for 
mitigation. 
 
Second, we manually assessed the actual relevance of these projects. This procedure led us to 
delete the vast majority of the above projects because the key words appeared in a context 
unrelated to mitigation activities. 
 
Third, we double-checked the mismatches between our coding and the more general donor 
coding for climate change mitigation-related projects available since 1995 to verify that no 
project was omitted from our coding simply for having escaped our initial mechanical search 
procedure. This led us to reconsider a total of 8854 projects which did not previously appear 
in our list of climate-relevant projects. Where necessary, our own mitigation codes were 
revised accordingly.2, 3 
 
The explanatory variables are drawn from different sources. Oil prices are obtained from the 
Energy Information Administration (2010a). A donor’s comparative advantage in renewable 
energy is drawn from a variety of sources for wind, hydro power, geothermal and 
photovoltaics (see Appendix 1). Green public preferences in donor countries are measured as 
the percentage of green seats in national parliaments (Armingeon et al., 2008). Finally, 
environmental preferences of the donor government are ‘proxied’ by the index of cabinet 
composition developed by Schmidt (1992) and updated by Armingeon et al. (2008). The 
index takes on values from 1 (hegemony of right-wing and centre parties) to 5 (hegemony of 
social-democratic and other left-wing parties). As ecological preferences are only imprecisely 
reflected in a left-right dimension (Knill, Debus and Heichel, 2010, p. 304), the ideal indicator 
would more closely reflect party positions (the indicator based on the assessment of party 
manifestos by Cusack and Engelhardt (2002) for example), but such data are not available for 
the whole time period under consideration and thus the Armingeon et al. (2008) index was 
retained. 
 
In order to reflect direct policy change in response to international agreements, we construct 
dummy variables for the periods from 1992 (post-Rio), from 1997 (post-Kyoto) and from 
2005 (post-Kyoto ratification) onwards. 
 
Before considering all these variables jointly in a multivariate regression model we will now 
look at the development of aid for energy efficiency and renewable energy over time and see, 
whether this directly suggests certain relationships. 
 
4. Renewable energy and energy efficiency in the PLAID database since 1970: an 
overview 
 
Considering all mitigation projects jointly, we cover the overall development of aid for 
renewable energy and energy efficiency. Figure 1.1 shows mitigation projects as a share of 
                                                 
2 Roberts et al. (2008) and Roberts, Weissberger and Peratsakis (2010) use more sophisticated coding methods 
based on a sub-sample of projects and machine-based recoding using a learning algorithm. We could not follow 
their procedures because we required information on all projects and detailed sub-categories within very limited 
time. However, the order of magnitude for the share of projects in the overall mitigation category seems to 
correspond between their approach and ours. 
3 For further details on our coding procedure see Michaelowa and Michaelowa (2010a), Appendix 1. 
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overall projects, while Figure 1.2 shows the corresponding shares in terms of commitments.4 
We add another time series for the evolution of the price of oil in Figure 2. Comparing 
Figure 1.1 and 1.2 it is directly evident that projects contributing to the mitigation of climate 
change show a distinct peak during the second oil crisis of 1979-85. It appears plausible that 
during this period renewable energy projects became fashionable to reduce the oil import bill 
of developing countries. After the oil price crash in 1986 project inflow remained stable 
throughout the 1990s, before decreasing with a certain lag after the oil price low of the late 
1990s. 
 
At the same time there is no visible impact of the climate policy decisions of the 1990s such 
as the signing of the UNFCCC in 1992, its entry into force in 1994 and the signing of the 
Kyoto Protocol in 1997. Even after the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol in 2005, and the 
debates about massively increasing financial flows to developing countries in the run-up to 
the Copenhagen conference late in 2009, mitigation project shares did not rise significantly 
above the level of the 1990s. 
 
In terms of commitments, inter-annual variability is much larger due to ‘lumpy’ large projects 
(see Figure 1.2). Still, two peaks during the second oil crisis and the mid-1990s – which might 
be linked to the Rio summit and entry into force of the UNFCCC – can be distinguished. 
However, just as in the case of project numbers, there is no long-term increase in mitigation-
related assistance, a fact that rather supports the thesis of ‘old wine’. Overall, mitigation 
projects are about three times larger than the average development assistance project. 
 
In order to see which changes occurred in detail, we will now proceed with a more fine-
grained assessment of projects according to different categories. And in order to avoid the 
dominance of single large projects in our graphical representation, we focus on project shares. 
We also expect that aid agency staff may concentrate on specific aid activities within their 
reach rather than optimise overall expenditure related to climate policy. If this is true, it 
should be easier to explain project shares than shares in overall aid commitments. 
 
4.1 Renewable energy 
 
We start with a discussion of hydro and geothermal power, technologies that have been 
mature for a long time. After covering those we look at more novel technologies, many of 
which were initially developed in industrialised countries as a reaction to the two oil crises of 
the 1970s and 1980s. Generally, the more mature the technology becomes, the higher the 
share of private sector investments, until development assistance covers only projects in 
countries with a dismal investment climate or lacking experience with application of the 
technology. The CDM has accelerated this development due to the revenues generated by the 
sale of emissions credits. 
 
Figures 1, 3-7: colonnes de gauche : % ?
                                                 
4 It does not make sense to consider absolute numbers here because both project numbers and financial volumes 
have considerably increased over time. Overall commitments covered by PLAID increased from USD 20 billion 
(constant 2000) in 1973 to almost USD 100 billion in 2008. Financial volumes can be measured only in terms of 
commitments, not in terms of disbursements, since, at least at project level, this variable has too many missing 
values in the dataset. Since the 1990s aid reporting shows a tendency to split large projects into many smaller 
ones. 
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Figure 1: Overall development of mitigation aid over time 
Figure 1.1: Share of climate change mitigation projects in total aid projects 
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Figure 1.2: Share of mitigation projects in overall commitments 
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Source: AidData (2010), authors’ coding  
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Figure 2: Evolution of oil prices1  
   
 
0 
20 
40 
60 
 
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
 
 
1 In constant 2005 USD. For details see Annex 1. 
Source: Energy Information Administration (2010a) 
 
It seems that the second oil crisis led indeed to a scramble for renewable energy in 
development assistance, epitomised by the UN Conference on New and Renewable Sources 
of Energy held in Nairobi in 1981. The conference proposed a USD 5 billion programme for 
non-hydro power renewables just for feasibility studies, research and other pre-investment 
activities. This never materialised due to the oil price reduction starting in 1986. By the late 
1980s many donors had become disillusioned and many aid recipients had come to view 
renewables as second-class technologies that industrialised countries were unwilling to adopt 
themselves (Kozloff and Shobowale, 1994). However, new renewables have seen a real 
upswing since the 1990s in which climate policy may have played an important role. In 
addition, the third oil crisis of the mid-2000s appears to be relevant as a driving force. 
 
Commercial hydro power has existed for over 100 years and dominates electricity generation 
in a large number of countries. In the 1950s and 1960s large dams were seen as a panacea to 
mobilise energy that would then automatically lead to industrial development. These 
expectations were, however, often disappointed. One of the most famous examples is the huge 
Akosombo dam, hydro power plant and associated aluminium smelter on the Volta river in 
Ghana completed in 1966. Darden Graduate School of Business Administration, University of 
Virginia (1999), neatly describes how Ghana suffered from the project in many respects. 
Two-thirds of the electricity was sold to the aluminium company at the derisory tariff of USD 
0.0026 per kWh for a period of 50 years despite the recommendation of the World Bank to fix 
the tariff at USD 0.0045 per kWh (Faber, 1990). Ghana financed 40 per cent of the total dam 
and aluminium smelter cost of USD 250 million directly from the budget and another 40 per 
cent were covered by loans from a variety of sources. Due to the strong hydrological 
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variability, there was no firm power available for local industrial development and Ghanaian 
development failed to take off. 
 
It seems that the mixed experiences with hydro power did not, however, deter donors from 
pushing hydro projects during the second oil crisis as the only large and technologically 
mature electricity generation alternative to fossil fuels (see Figure 3.1). Since the late 1980s 
hydro projects have been attacked by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) due to their 
negative consequences for the local population without adequate compensation, with strong 
resistance focusing on dam projects in China (Three Gorges), India (Narmada) and Brazil 
(Amazonian dams like Tucurui). Moreover, environmentalists started to worry about methane 
emissions from rotting tropical biomass flooded by reservoirs (Fearnside, 2002). An often 
overlooked but key reason for the decline of hydro projects was that power generation costs of 
fossil power plants fell from the 1980s onwards (IEA and NEA, 2005), while hydro power 
costs tended to increase. After the World Commission on Dams (2000) recommendations, 
which managed to reduce the conflicts between dam builders and the local population through 
early participation of potentially impacted stakeholders, detailed benefit sharing mechanisms 
and allocation of funds for an effective monitoring and evaluation system covering project 
performance, safety and impacts, a stabilisation of project inflow has been seen, albeit on a 
very low level. 
 
Geothermal energy has been exploited commercially in Italy for over a century and in New 
Zealand and the United States (US) since the Second World War. As it requires volcanic heat, 
its application in developing countries has been concentrated in South-East Asia. The oil 
crises of the 1970s and 1980s triggered great interest as the technology could immediately be 
implemented on a large scale (see Figure 3.2); at 56 per cent it got the lion’s share of funding 
for ‘non-large’ hydro renewables in the period from 1979 to 1991 (Kozloff and Shobowale, 
1994, p. 18). With the fall in oil and coal prices, geothermal power became uncompetitive. 
After the 1990s the demise of the Suharto government in Indonesia, which had actively 
pushed geothermal development despite high costs (Waldman and Solomon, 1998), led to a 
near freezing of project inflow. 
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Figure 3: Traditional renewable energy 
Figure 3.1: Hydro projects as a share of all aid projects 
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Figure 3.2: Geothermal projects as a share of all aid projects 
 
geothermal_observations
0
0.0002
0.0004
0.0006
0.0008
0.001
0.0012
0.0014
0.0016
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
 
Source: AidData (2010), authors’ coding 
 
Solar energy is a decentralised energy form well suited for development of remote rural areas, 
if maintenance can be assured. As immediately evident from Figure 4.1, it also benefited from 
the alternative energy push during the second oil crisis but suffered from high costs and low 
performance. Therefore, it dwindled after 1986. Technological improvements with a 
 11 
concurring decline in costs led to a re-emergence from the mid-1990s. After the Rio 
conference of 1992 a remarkable increase took place, which petered out in the late 1990s. 
 
Wind power development for small applications started in the 1980s (see Figure 4.2). At this 
time it was seen as rural development policy and did not really depend on the price of oil, thus 
remaining at a high level until 1990. When the Danish and German development of wind 
technology led to robust large-scale wind turbines for electricity generation a second peak of 
project development started in the mid-1990s, when it almost reached the level of solar 
projects. Since then project inflow has decreased as wind power has become a large industry 
that is fully commercial with revenues from sales of emissions credits under the CDM. Only 
‘first of its kind’ projects in countries without any wind power experience continue to be 
financed by development assistance. 
 
Figure 4: Solar and wind  
Figure 4.1: Solar projects as a share of all aid projects 
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Figure 4.2: Wind projects as a share of all aid projects 
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Source: AidData (2010), authors’ coding 
 
Biomass power was part of the generic renewable energy upswing during the second oil crisis 
but lost lustre after the oil price crash in 1986 (see Figure 5.1). During the 1990s successes 
with bagasse cogeneration in Brazil (Coelho and Bolognini, 1999) led to renewed attempts to 
promote agricultural residue-based power plants. Moreover, by the 1990s the technology was 
fully mastered and could guarantee performance (Purohit and Michaelowa, 2007). The 
slowdown in the first half of the 2000s cannot be attributed to any specific event. Perhaps the 
availability of the CDM as an alternative source of finance led to a reduction of the donors’ 
willingness to support a technology that was seen as commercially viable with CDM 
revenues. Overall numbers of biomass projects were historically lower than for the other 
renewable energy types but are now on a par with wind. 
 
Biogas plants are a modular technology with strong rural development benefits. The focus on 
alternative energy in the context of the second oil crisis in the 1980s triggered initial 
activities, but performance was often a problem and thus project numbers fell (see Figure 5.2). 
Only very recently an increase to 1980s levels could be observed. Overall biogas project 
numbers are several times smaller than for other renewable energy technologies. 
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Figure 5: Biomass and biogas 
Figure 5.1: Biomass projects as a share of all aid projects 
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Figure 5.2: Biogas projects as a share of all aid projects 
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Source: AidData (2010), authors’ coding 
 
Other renewable energy projects are even more recent. Landfill gas projects focus on 
advanced countries that have a development level sufficient to ensure a coordinated waste 
management strategy; landfills need to be lined and delivery of organic waste ensured. As 
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their energy benefit is relatively small, but the GHG benefit large due to the high warming 
potential of methane, they have only been discovered since the Kyoto Protocol. When it 
became clear after 2005 that the CDM would generate sufficient revenues to mobilise landfill 
projects donor interest decreased. Many of the projects do not generate energy but just flare 
the methane. Project numbers are comparable to those for biogas (see Figure 6.1). 
 
Finally, there are also cross-sectoral projects that address renewable energy in general, such as 
support in developing incentives for renewable investments, resource measurements and 
multi-technology activities. They had their first great upswing during the second oil crisis, 
when alternative energy was seen as the answer (see Figure 6.2). But initial high expectations 
were disappointed when performance problems plagued the projects. Nevertheless, projects 
continued to come in, albeit on a lower level. Only after signature of the Kyoto Protocol is a 
significant increase visible. The third oil crisis appears to have triggered a further increase, 
reaching a value double that of the largest single-technology category. 
 
Figure 6: Other renewable energy and combined projects 
Figure 6.1: Landfill gas projects as a share of all aid projects 
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Figure 6.2: Renewable energy cross-cutting projects as a share of all aid projects 
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Source: AidData (2010), authors’ coding 
 
4.2 Energy efficiency 
 
It is not easy to obtain a comprehensive overview of energy efficiency projects because they 
can occur in many different guises. We focus on key technologies, such as power plant 
rehabilitation, cogeneration and cookstove efficiency. 
 
Efficiency improvement in power generation and industry requires specific engineering 
expertise which is usually not prevalent in development assistance administrations. In general, 
such measures have very low costs but face numerous commercial and political barriers as 
well as split incentives; a commercially attractive project may not be undertaken because the 
tenant benefits but the landlord would have to bear the investment. In the mid-1990s large 
energy efficiency projects were fashionable due to the end of the Cold War and the related 
market transformation activities in many formerly socialist countries (see Figure 7.1). 
However, the gap in the early 2000s is difficult to explain. Perhaps donors thought that the 
rising price of oil would mobilise efficiency improvements without any need for donor 
involvement. Project volumes have reached a level comparable with the larger renewable 
energy categories. 
 
As opposed to cogeneration, cookstove efficiency improvement projects can be well 
integrated into integrated rural development strategies in very poor countries, particularly in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. They were very fashionable in the 1980s (Hyman, 1987), before 
performance problems with the many competing stove designs led to a ‘hangover’ (see 
Figure 7.3). After the success of the Kenyan ‘Jiko’ stove, of which over two million were sold 
through private entrepreneurs during the 1990s (Theuri, 2005), stove projects picked up again 
from 1999, especially given their substantial CO2 reduction contribution at low cost. But they 
have not reached their former peaks, which is probably due to an increase of competing NGO 
activities and a tendency to operate them on a private business model (Bailis et al., 2009). 
Project numbers have reached less than half of the average of renewable energy technologies 
with the exception of the ‘fashion period’ in the mid-1980s, which is probably due to the 
organisational challenges compared to other renewable energy projects. 
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4.3. Some preliminary conclusions 
 
The detailed discussion of individual project types shows that not all of them have evolved in 
the same way. Differences are related to technological development and to the extent to which 
certain technologies have been seen as cost-efficient substitutes for other energy sources. At 
the same time we observe trends that seem to be related to certain fashions and even to the 
success of specific marketing campaigns. Overall, the price of oil appears to play a dominant 
role leading to distinct peaks of project shares in the early 1980s for virtually all renewable 
energy and energy efficiency projects, except for those which were simply not known at that 
time. This provides strong support for the related ‘old wine’ hypothesis. At the same time, 
only a few project types, such as landfill gas and to a minor extent biomass and solar, also 
show trends that coincide with key international climate policy events like the Rio and Kyoto 
conferences. 
 
In the following section we will see whether, as a whole, these global political developments 
have a significant effect. In addition, we will examine whether we can observe any effect of 
political developments at the national level in donor countries. With respect to the ‘old wine’ 
model, we will more systematically examine not only the relevance of the price of oil but also 
the relevance of any given donor’s comparative advantages. 
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Figure 7: Energy efficiency 
Figure 7.1: Efficiency projects as a share of all aid projects 
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Figure 7.2: Cogeneration projects as a share of all aid projects 
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Figure 7.3: Cookstove efficiency projects as a share of all aid projects 
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5. Which parameters do count: results of the econometric analysis 
 
The regression analysis, details of which are described in Appendix 1, is carried out for all 
renewable energy and energy efficiency projects (that is, in fact, all mitigation projects) 
jointly because the sub-sectors considered above may partially be a substitute for each other 
when governments try to adjust their aid budgets to policy change or change in traditional 
determinants such as the price of oil. 
 
Results in all regressions related to project numbers clearly confirm the significance of the 
price of oil. Considering the results of Regressions 2 and 3 (see Appendix 1) implies that a 
USD 10 increase in the price of oil leads to a 7 per cent higher probability of mitigation aid 
and to an increase in the project share of mitigation projects by 0.15 percentage points. 
Considering that the average project share is only 1 per cent, this increase is substantial. As 
could be expected from the visual analysis of Figures 1.2 and 2 in Chapter 4, no such effect is 
observed for mitigation-related commitments. 
 
With respect to the other ‘old wine’ variables, the picture is less clear. The indicators of 
donors’ comparative advantage in different renewable energy sectors tend to have the 
expected positive effect on the decision whether at all to provide mitigation aid but are less 
clearly significant in the aid allocation equations. This is true, in particular, for hydro power, 
where the donor’s home country experience with the technology seems to have a strong 
impact on the country’s decision to provide some aid in the area, but does not seem to drive 
the decision regarding either the number of projects or the financial volume committed. In the 
allocation regression of project shares only the donors’ capacity in wind energy is significant. 
In the regression of commitment shares only the donors’ production of solar energy turns out 
to be significant. 
 
Turning to the variables of the policy change hypotheses, we observe a positive effect of the 
Rio conference on the decision to provide some mitigation aid. The effect is very strong, 
indicating that from 1992 onwards the probability that donors would allocate at least some aid 
to mitigation increased by 35 percentage points (Regression 3). The Rio conference is also 
reflected in higher project numbers, although this effect is not significant at the 5 per cent 
level (p-value of 9 per cent). 
 
After the Kyoto conference in 1997 and the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2005, 
however, the trend is reversed. We obtain negative coefficients in almost all regressions, and 
the negative coefficients for the post-Kyoto dummy are significant in both allocation 
equations related to project numbers as well as commitments. In fact, the post-Kyoto dummy 
is one of only two variables significant in the commitment regression. Even more strikingly, 
the negative coefficients are so high (in absolute terms) that they over-compensate the 
positive effect of the Rio dummy. It seems as if donors tried to work on an integration of 
climate change mitigation into aid in the preparation of the Kyoto conference, whereas they 
considered that enough time and effort had been spent on this issue once the conference was 
over. Global political trends thus appear to play a role, but not always in the way one would 
expect. 
 
Donors’ national political trends towards environmental preferences also do not uniformly 
show the expected effect. The share of green parliamentarians is positively significant only in 
the selection equation, while it is even negatively significant in the allocation equation. On 
average, greener donor parliaments thus seem to lead to a higher probability of being active in 
the area of aid related to renewable energy and energy efficiency, but this does not increase 
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the share of projects or commitments. This is in contrast to climate aid reporting in this area, 
which has been shown to be significantly and positively related to green voting preferences 
(Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2010a). The presence of left-wing or right-wing governments 
does not seem to have any effect either. 
 
All in all, looking at the project shares, we find strong evidence for the ‘old wine’ model 
driven by the oil price variable. We also find evidence for the policy change model, but this 
clearly works in the expected direction only for the impact of the Rio conference and even 
shows a reverse trend thereafter. Local political variables do not show any clear effect. 
 
As expected, the explanatory power of the commitments regression is much lower, but even 
here we find the negatively significant effect of the Kyoto conference. This is intriguing 
because it confirms that policy-makers do react to global trends but that large international 
conferences may sometimes mark the end of the efforts rather than their beginning. 
Subsequent to the conference, new topics take up the policy-makers’ attention and the 
promises made at the conference are rapidly forgotten. This effect is also visible in the large 
numbers of newly created financing mechanisms, only a few of which are ever funded 
sufficiently. 
 
It should be noted, though, that the overall picture drawn here may hide substantial 
differences between individual donors. While we consider fixed effects, we do not consider 
interaction terms with the different explanatory variables or individual regressions for each 
donor (which would be of limited value given the relatively small number of observations by 
country). Our analysis thereby only shows the effects on average. 
 
A group of important countries has actually reduced renewable energy and energy efficiency 
aid projects over time. One can differentiate these countries into two groups. The first consists 
of those that were quite active during the second oil crisis (and sometimes also during the 
1990s) but where an event such as the advent of a government hostile to climate policy led to 
a drying up of climate-related aid flows. Both the US and Australia (which opposed the Kyoto 
Protocol) exhibit these patterns, as well as Canada (whose government elected in early 2006 
essentially envisages not complying with the Kyoto Protocol commitments) and Italy (where 
the Berlusconi government has repeatedly voiced doubts about the relevance of climate 
change). 
 
The temporal patterns differ among the countries, but in all four cases a large number of aid 
projects during the second oil crisis was followed by a decline in the late 1980s. In Australia 
and the US a short-lived revival occurred during the 1990s, which is absent in Italy. In 
Canada the downward trend was broken in 2000-05 but resumed after the Conservative 
government took office. It is obvious that the repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol played a key 
role in the declines seen in Australia, Canada and the US. 
 
A second group of countries with declining aid for mitigation – France, Japan, Switzerland 
and the United Kingdom (UK) – has consistently supported international climate policy, with 
the UK even claiming to be a pioneer in the field. Apparently these governments were not 
willing to sustain the relatively high share of energy projects achieved during the second oil 
crisis. The development over time differs between countries. France shows a secondary peak 
in the late 1980s, Japan in the run-up to the Kyoto conference, Switzerland immediately after 
the Rio Conference and the UK in the early 1990s. 
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We can identify a few countries that have been traditionally active in development policy, 
whose governments see themselves as climate policy pioneers and which indeed showed 
increased activity not only during the second oil crisis but also, at least to some extent, at the 
time when climate policy became relevant. Germany exhibits a very strong mid-1990s peak, 
probably linked to the first Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC held in Berlin in 1995, 
with minor peaks during the second oil crisis and in the late 2000s. The Netherlands has a 
post-Kyoto peak and a second oil crisis peak. Norway has a late 1980s peak which coincides 
with a very active period for this country at the international climate policy negotiations. 
While equally perceived as a strong promoter of climate change mitigation, Sweden shows a 
peak during the second oil crisis which is higher than that of the late 1990s, and the country is 
on the verge of becoming a member of another group of countries with a long-term decline in 
mitigation aid. 
 
Finally, some countries show no, or only rare, cases of projects in renewable energy and 
energy efficiency before the end of the 1980s, but continuous activity thereafter. They include 
countries with a long history of development cooperation (Denmark and Finland) but also 
relative newcomers (Austria and Spain). In these cases it is likely that the rise of climate 
policy triggered the mitigation aid activities. Graphical illustrations of these country cases can 
be found in Annex 2, Figures A.1 – A.4. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In contrast to popular belief and expectations in the scientific literature, the advent of 
international climate policy in the 1990s did not boost renewable energy and energy 
efficiency projects in bilateral development cooperation, which is responsible for the lion’s 
share of overall aid. Overall, the share of mitigation projects in total bilateral development 
assistance projects fell significantly from the second oil crisis peak reached in 1981 and 
reached a low in 2005, only returning to 1990s averages in 2008. The Rio summit comes 
along with a significant increase in aid related to these projects. But the Kyoto conference in 
1997, with the agreement of the Kyoto Protocol, and the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 
2005 did not reinforce but rather reversed this trend. 
 
The share of financial mitigation commitments shows two peaks: one during the second oil 
crisis and one in the mid-to-late 1990s. Again, Kyoto seems to have reduced climate-related 
aid rather than to have enhanced it. This is one of the few variables with a significant effect on 
commitment shares. 
 
A technology-specific assessment finds a strong decline in ‘traditional’ renewable energy 
projects such as hydro and geothermal power from their peak in the early 1980s. The ‘new’ 
renewables such as solar, wind and biomass show twin peaks in the early 1980s and the late 
1990s. Only cross-technology renewable energy projects surpassed the early 1980s peak in 
the mid-2000s. Energy efficiency projects increased substantially until the mid-1990s, but 
went through a weak phase in the mid-2000s. The decline in mature technologies may be due 
to the emergence of the CDM and the revenue from the sale of emissions credits, which led to 
private sector investments and reduced the need for projects financed by development aid. 
 
Donor countries exhibit distinct patterns. Apart from countries opposing climate policy such 
as the US, Australia, Canada and Italy, France, Japan, Switzerland and the UK show 
decreasing engagement in the sector. In countries like Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and 
Sweden mitigation-related aid does not exhibit a clear trend but shows peaks related to both, 
the oil crises and global political developments. Yet another group of countries has started 
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mitigation-related support only since the emergence of climate policy as a major issue in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. It consists of Austria, Denmark, Finland and Spain. Only in these 
cases is it obvious that really ‘new’ mitigation development assistance has been provided. 
 
All in all, fears that development assistance may have been diverted from its central priorities 
through a new policy drive towards climate mitigation do not seem to be justified. On the 
contrary, it seems that donors have deliberately provided the impression that they increased 
aid for climate mitigation. While the policy change model is correct in that international 
conferences appear to have been turning points for donors’ aid allocation, the turn did not 
always happen in the expected direction. At the same time considering the existing aid related 
to renewable energy and energy efficiency only as ‘old wine’ also appears to be only partially 
appropriate. Nevertheless, the single most robust variable in explaining the change of 
renewable energy and energy efficiency over time is the price of oil, independently of any 
change in global or national environmental preferences.  In the future statements regarding the 
increase of aid for a politically fashionable purpose should always be treated with caution. A 
policy recommendation would be to require calculation of aid allocations for the new purpose 
not only for the current budget year but also for the past. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Details of the econometric analysis and variable descriptions 
 
As there can be no negative project shares, the data are censored at zero. One option to 
econometrically deal with this type of data is to use a Tobit model. Results of this estimation 
are shown in column 1 of Table A.1. However, the Tobit model is problematic when the 
general decision about aid activities in the area of mitigation (‘selection equation’) is not 
driven by the same determinants as the decision on project numbers or actual aid volume, 
given that mitigation aid is non-zero (‘allocation equation’). To find out whether there may be 
such problems, we also present the selection and the allocation equations separately (columns 
2 and 3 versus columns 4 and 5). The analysis demonstrates that for certain variables the 
coefficients show the opposite signs (compare for example the coefficients of Regression 3 
and Regression 5 for solar production). This leads us to prefer the separate estimations. 
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Table A.1: Determinants of mitigation aid 
 Regression 1 
Tobit 
Regression 2 
Logit, FE 
Regression 3 
OLS, FE 
Regression 4 
OLS, FE 
Regression 5 
OLS, FE  
Dep. Var. 
Mitigation project 
share 
Dummy for 
Mitigation project 
share >0 
Dummy for 
Mitigation project 
share >0 
Mitigation 
project share (for 
share >0) 
Mitigation 
commitment share 
(for share >0) 
‘Old wine’           
Oil price 0.000446 ** 0.055 ** 0.0073 ** 0.000156 * 0.000072  
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.62)  
Capacity hydro 0.000174  0.369 ** 0.0152 ** -0.000012  -0.000451  
 (0.21)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.97)  (0.47)  
Capacity wind 0.000001  0.004 * 0.0000  0.000001 * 0.000001  
 (0.26)  (0.01)  (0.79)  (0.02)  (0.23)  
Capacity 
geothermal 0.000004  0.040 * 0.0002 * 0.000000  -0.000002  
 (0.29)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.99)  (0.79)  
Production 
solar -0.000036 * 0.026  -0.0005 * -0.000019  0.000058 * 
 (0.01)  (0.92)  (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.01)  
Policy change          
Post-Rio 0.019321 ** 2.799 ** 0.3471 ** 0.004223  0.001143  
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.09)  (0.83)  
Post-Kyoto -0.006632 * 1.083  0.0633  -0.010265 ** -0.013824 * 
 (0.02)  (0.11)  (0.14)  (0.00)  (0.01)  
Post–Kyoto 
ratification -0.014477 ** -3.418 ** -0.1780 ** -0.007963 * -0.006786  
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.35)  
Green seats 0.001784 ** 0.469 ** 0.0502 ** -0.000932 * -0.000293  
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.04)  (0.76)  
Cabinet 
composition -0.000543  -0.179  -0.0111  0.000292  0.000028  
 (0.37)  (0.08)  (0.22)  (0.61)  (0.98)  
Overall sign. 
P-value 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
R² (within)     39.93%  12.37%  5.34%  
N 780  (287 
censored + 493 
uncensored) 
780  780  493  493 
 
No. of donors 21  21  21  21  21  
Notes: OLS: ordinary least squares. Constant and fixed effects (FE) not shown. P-values in parentheses, ** for 
coefficients significant at the 1 per cent level, * for coefficients significant at the 5 per cent level. 
 
In addition, a Hausman test strongly suggests the use of donor fixed effects to avoid bias. This 
also favours the separate estimation of the selection and the allocation equations because the 
Tobit model is based on a random effects approach. 
Unfortunately, estimating the selection equation separately with a Logit fixed effects 
approach also creates problems. First, we may face an incidental parameter problem. 
Circumventing this problem through the use of a conditional Logit would make us lose a 
substantial amount of observations as year-to-year changes from zero to positive mitigation 
project numbers are not very frequent. However, as our time series is relatively long (covering 
almost 40 years), the potential inconsistency implied by a standard fixed effect Logit model 
should be rather limited. 
Second, and more difficult to solve here, is the fact that the standard Logit model explains our 
results too well. Out of 780 donor/year observations, it completely determines one failure and 
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68 successes. This generated some instability in the estimation and made it impossible to 
compute marginal effects at the mean of the explanatory variables. 
In order to be sure that our results are meaningful, we thus also carry out a simple OLS FE 
regression for the selection equation. This linear probability model is shown in Regression 3. 
Finally, we present two different allocation equations limiting the sample to those 
observations with non-zero values of mitigation aid. The first of these (Regression 4) uses our 
key dependent variable, namely the share of mitigation-related projects within overall aid. 
The second (Regression 5) uses the share of commitments rather than the share of individual 
aid projects. Based on our discussion in Section 4, which points to a reaction of donors 
through new projects rather than higher volumes, we would expect this last regression to have 
less explanatory power than Regression 4. 
All explanatory variables relating either to the ‘old wine’ model or to the policy change model 
are included simultaneously in the regressions in order to avoid omitted variable bias. 
 
Table A.2: Variable description 
Variable Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Source 
Mitigation project share 0.01 0.016 0 0.17 AidData (2010), authors’ coding1 
Mitigation commitment share  0.02 0.036 0 0.33 AidData (2010), authors’ coding1 
Oil price: refiner acquisition cost of 
imported crude oil, constant 2005 USD 
34.5 18.46 7.40 85.13 Energy Information Administration 
(2010a) 
Capacity hydro: installed hydro power 
capacity in donor countries, in GW 
(imputed until 1980 and for 2008 using 
hydro power production in kWh) 
14.42 20.19 0 90.3 Energy Information Administration 
(2010b) 
Capacity wind: installed wind power 
capacity in donor countries, in MW 
600.3 2412.4 0 25170 Worldwatch Institute, (2001), Chinese 
Renewable Energy Industries 
Association (2007), American Wind 
Energy Association (1999), Global 
Wind EnergyCouncil (2009) 
Capacity geothermal: installed geothermal 
power capacity in donor countries, in MW 
130.1 465.39 0 3043 International Geothermal Association 
(2010), Bertani (2007), Geothermal 
Energy Association (2008, 2010), 
Amici de la Terra (2008), Cappetti, 
Passaleva and Sabatelli (2000), 
Kawazoe and Combs (2004), Cabeças, 
Carvalho and Nunes (2010), Sifford 
and Bloomquist (2000), US 
Department of Energy (1997), Lund 
(2004) 
Production solar: Solar photovoltaic cell 
production in donor countries, in MW 
15.76 96.2 0 1331 Worldwatch Institute (2004), 
Prometheus Institute (2007), 
Prometheus Institute and Greentech 
Media (2009), IEA (various years) 
Post-Rio: dummy (= 1 if year ≥1992, 
= 0 otherwise) 
0.44 0.50 0 1  
Post-Kyoto: dummy (= 1 if year ≥1997, 
= 0 otherwise) 
0.31 0.46 0 1  
Post-Kyoto ratification: dummy (= 1 if year 
≥2005, = 0 otherwise) 
0.10 0.30 0 1  
Green seats (share of seats in national 
parliament, in %) 
 
2.42 3.42 0 13.3 Armingeon et al. (2008) 
Cabinet composition (Schmidt index: from 
1: hegemony of right-wing and centre 
parties, to 5: hegemony of social-democratic 
and other left-wing parties) 
2.50 1.62 1 5 Armingeon et al. (2008), Schmidt 
(1992) 
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1 The base data to compute this share are available as an online appendix to Michaelowa and Michaelowa 
(2010a) at http://www.cis.ethz.ch/publications/publications.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Development of mitigation aid over time, selected country cases 
 
Figure A.1: Decreasing aid for mitigation projects from governments sceptical of climate 
policy1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Share of total number of development assistance projects. 
 
Source: AidData (2010), authors’ coding 
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Figure A.2: Decreasing aid for mitigation projects from governments supporting climate 
policy1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Share of total number of development assistance projects. 
 
Source: AidData (2010), authors’ coding 
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Figure A.3: Oscillating aid for mitigation projects1 
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1 Share of total number of development assistance projects. 
 
Source: AidData (2010), authors’ coding 
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Figure A.4: Onset of aid for mitigation projects only after the start of climate policy1 
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1 Share of total number of development assistance projects. 
 
Source: AidData (2010), authors’ coding 
 
